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Abstract 
This paper develops a theoretical framework for four sustainability paradigms (weak sustainability, 
a-growth, de-growth, strong sustainability) within cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios, and 
includes changes in four values (a sense of responsibility to nature and future generations; aversion 
to inequality for current and future generations). The model assesses the feasibility of sustainability 
solutions for a shared environment as a function of specific value changes in each country by 
interpreting these value changes as support for environmental policies. The solutions are defined in 
terms of consumption, use of the environment, and welfare of representative individuals in each 
country; they are characterised by efficiency and equality at both intra- and inter-generational 
levels; they are checked for internal consistency and consistency with alternative approaches such 
as utilitarianism, egalitarianism (i.e., Arneson, Dworkin, Sen), and contractarianism. Theoretical 
insights are obtained by comparing contextual stability and relative effectiveness of the 
environment’s use among countries in alternative scenarios. A case study of the Baltic Sea 
operationally suggests that the currently adopted strong sustainability (i.e., an ecosystem approach) 
in a non-cooperative scenario (i.e., countries attempt to maximize their own rather than overall 
welfare) is internally consistent, relatively efficient, and consistent with Dworkin egalitarianism. A-
growth was never feasible, but de-growth in which Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Sweden 
increase environmental protection would increase intra-generational equality; de-growth or weak 
sustainability in which Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia increase environmental R&D 
would increase intra- and inter-generational equality; weak sustainability and de-growth consistent 
with Arneson and Dworkin egalitarianism would improve the environmental status. 
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1. Introduction 
Four main sustainability paradigms have been suggested in the literature (Zagonari, 2016): weak 
sustainability, a-growth, de-growth, and strong sustainability. Note that in this context, the 
economic general equilibrium framework is similar to weak sustainability, whereas the ecosystem 
services framework is close to strong sustainability. As well, two main value changes have been 
evoked to achieve sustainability: a sense of responsibility for nature (Pedersen, 2015; Saniotis, 
2012; Van der Werff et al., 2013) or for future generations (Caselles, 2013; Koukouzelis, 2012), and 
an aversion to inequality with respect to current or future generations (Golub et al., 2013; Kopnina, 
2016). Note that improved environmental technology and modified consumption patterns can be 
considered here as context changes for any combination of paradigms and values. 
The purpose of the present study was to develop a model for the four sustainability paradigms 
within a single framework that accounts for changes in the four values (a sense of responsibility for 
nature or future generations; aversion to intra- or inter-generational inequality) and that could be 
used to socially characterise each country that cooperates (or chooses to not cooperate) in managing 
a shared environment, such as a sea. To support this goal, I develop a model to assess the feasibility 
of various sustainability solutions for a shared environment that depend on changes in values that 
could support specific environmental policies in each country. Analytical solutions will be 
characterised using the consumption level, the direct and indirect use of Earth’s resources 
(hereafter, environment use), and the welfare level for representative individuals in each country by 
providing both theoretical insights and empirical findings. In particular, analytical solutions will be 
developed to theoretically compare the stability of each solution in response to changes in context 
and the relative effectiveness of environment uses in different countries in alternative scenarios. 
These analytical solutions will be applied to the Baltic Sea as a case study to empirically rank the 
sustainability solutions in terms of their feasibility, stability, and effectiveness. 
Moreover, I will discuss two key efficiency concepts (i.e., Pareto- and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency with 
respect to welfare) and two key inequality measures (i.e., Gini and MaxMin inequalities with 
respect to consumption, environment use, and welfare) at both intra- and inter-generational levels. 
This will empirically reveal the internal consistency of the sustainability paradigms with respect to 
inequality (e.g., weak sustainability cannot be linked to a large aversion to inequality) and to 
efficiency (e.g., weak sustainability must be coupled with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). 
Finally, three main equity approaches will be described: a utilitarian approach (i.e., Harsanyi), an 
egalitarian approach (i.e., Arneson for welfare; Dworkin for consumption or environment use; Sen 
for consumption and environment use), and a contractarian approach (i.e., Rawls) (Habib, 2013). 
This will empirically characterize the sustainability solutions in terms of distributive justice. 
Note that equality refers to providing the same consumption, environment use, or welfare to all 
parties, even if that is not a “fair” distribution, whereas equity refers to a “fair” distribution, even if 
that distribution is not equal. 
In other words, from a positive perspective, this study will identify for each sustainability paradigm 
which value changes are crucial to meet sustainability conditions for a shared environment (here, 
the Baltic Sea) by turning specific value changes (e.g., a sense of responsibility for nature or future 
generations) in each country into specific environmental policies (e.g., environmental protection 
and R&D) in each country. I will also determine the internal consistency of each solution and its 
consistency with various equity approaches by measuring its efficiency in terms of welfare and its 
effectiveness in terms of environment use. 
Note that all insights about the feasibility of a sustainability paradigm for the current generation are 
based on per capita data for representative individuals in each country, weighted according to the 
country’s proportion of the total population in the study area. Moreover, the responses of 
sustainability conditions to the main changes in context (i.e., improved technology, modified 
consumption) are examined (Zagonari, 2015). Finally, a representative individual for all countries 
from the current generation is compared with one from the future generation to describe inter-
generational equity and efficiency. 
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2. Paradigms, concepts, and approaches 
This section concisely defines the four sustainability paradigms, efficiency concepts, and equity 
approaches identified in section 1. 
A sustainability solution is Pareto-efficient if current generations in each country obtain greater 
welfare than in the status quo situation. In other words, there are no losers. A sustainability solution 
is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if current generations in all countries combined obtain greater welfare 
than in the status quo situation so that the losers can potentially receive compensation from the 
winners. A sustainability solution reduces inequalities between current generations in terms of 
consumption, environment use, or welfare level if the Gini index for one or more of these variables 
is smaller than the Gini index for the same variable in the status quo situation; it is then defined as 
Gini-equitable. A sustainability solution improves the conditions for the least advantaged current 
generation in terms of consumption, environment use, or welfare if the minimum value of one or 
more variables is larger than its value in the status quo situation; it is then defined as MaxMin-
equitable. 
The main assumptions behind weak sustainability (i.e., development that meets the needs of the 
present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs) 
can be summarized as follows (Schlör et al., 2015): needs are used as the unit of measurement; the 
same weights are used for current and future generations; and there is unconditional substitution 
among current economic, social, and environmental forms of capital at both intra- and inter-
generational levels. A sustainability solution is consistent with weak sustainability if it is at least 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, and if it assumes small aversion to inter- and intra-generational inequality. 
A-growth is an ecological and economic strategy focused on indifference to or neutrality about the 
economic level and growth, which are considered non-robust and unreliable indicators of social 
welfare and progress (Van den Bergh, 2010, 2011). It can be characterised as follows: welfare is 
used as the unit of measurement, as deduced from the aim of moving from wrong prices that result 
from the many neglected non-market transactions (e.g., informal activities and relationships) and 
the many unpriced environmental effects to right prices (i.e., prices that account for both non-
market and unpriced values); different weights are used for current and future generations; and 
substitution between forms of capital is possible. A sustainability solution is consistent with a-
growth if it is Gini-equitable for welfare, and if it assumes a small aversion to inter-generational and 
intra-generational inequality. 
De-growth is an ecological and economic perspective based on achieving a socially sustainable and 
equitable reduction (and eventually stabilization) of the quantity of materials and energy that a 
society extracts, processes, transports, distributes, consumes, and returns to the environment as 
wastes (Kallis, 2011; Kallis et al., 2012). It can be characterised as follows: happiness is the unit of 
measurement, with a priority on meeting the needs of the poorest individuals, as deduced from the 
aim of introducing a basic income; the same weight is assigned to current and future generations; 
and substitution among forms of capital is acceptable. A sustainability solution is consistent with a 
de-growth paradigm if it is MaxMin-equitable for welfare and if it assumes a large aversion to inter- 
and intra-generational inequality. 
The main assumptions behind strong sustainability (i.e., a development that allows future 
generations to access the same amount of natural resources and the same environmental status as 
the current generation) can be summarized as follows (Jain & Jain, 2013): requirements for some 
incommensurable categories as the unit of measurement; possibly assignment of different weights to 
current and future generations; and no substitution between current or future forms of capital, with 
natural and physical or social capital considered to be complementary. A sustainability solution is 
consistent with strong sustainability if it is Gini-equitable for consumption and environment use, 
and if it assumes a large aversion to inter- and intra-generational inequality. 
Utilitarianism, in the version considered here (Harsanyi, 1982), can be characterised as follows: 
equally weighting everyone’s welfare, with welfare defined as the satisfaction of rational, well-
informed, and self-interested preferences, by maximising the total social welfare. A sustainability 
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solution is consistent with the utilitarian approach if it is Pareto-efficient or Kaldor-Hicks efficient 
and if it assumes a small aversion to inter- and intra-generational inequality. 
Egalitarianism, in the main three alternative versions that I focus on here, can be summarised as 
follows: it involves (1) levelling of resources or primary goods, as in Dworkin (1981); (2) 
equalising capabilities, as in Sen (1993); or (3) equalising opportunities for welfare, as in Arneson 
(1989). A sustainability solution is consistent with these egalitarian approaches if it assumes a large 
aversion to inter- and intra-generational inequality, and if it is Gini-equitable in consumption or 
environment for case 1, Gini equitable in consumption and environment for case 2, and Gini-
equitable in welfare for case 3. 
Contractarianism, in the version considered here (Rawls, 1971), can be characterised as follows: it 
arranges social and economic inequalities to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged people by 
opening offices and positions to everybody. A sustainability solution is consistent with the 
contractarian approach if it is MaxMin-equitable for consumption, environment, or welfare, and if it 
assumes a large aversion to inter- and intra-generational inequality. 
Note that my analysis disregards libertarian approaches, both in terms of positive rights (Lomasky, 
1987) and negative rights (Nozick, 1974), because it is arguable whether future generations or 
nature have rights in this context (Gosseries, 2008). Next, equality is assumed to be instrumental 
(Kershnar & Purves, 2016), since a value is attached to the consequences for people. 
3. The model 
This section provides simple formalisations for the four sustainability paradigms identified in 
Section 2, with the goal of requiring as little data as possible about representative individuals in 
each country. See Appendix A for a list of all abbreviations used in the model. 
Let us assume that Ei identifies the per capita use of the shared environment by the current 
generation in country i. The per capita equilibrium level consistent with the current relevant 
population is η. Let us assume that Xi identifies the per capita consumption of the current generation 
in country i. Thus, the use of the environment for the current generation in country i is given by Ei = 
θi Xi, and for the future generation is given by EF = θF XF, where θi and θF represent the use of the 
environment for each consumption unit for the current generation in country i and for the future 
generation, respectively: θi will be set at current values based on the current technology, and then 
simulated as smaller than current values to analyse the impacts of a technological improvement, 
whereas θF is assumed to be the average of θi across all countries: 
𝑋𝐹 =  η θF with θF⁄ =
1
𝑛
∑ θ𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 
Two main sustainability conditions can be formalised. The weighted sustainability condition 
requires that use of the shared environment be weighted according to the proportions of the total 
population in the relevant countries (pi): 𝐸𝐶 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝐸𝑖, where EC stands for the total weighted use 
of the shared environment by the current generation. The non-weighted sustainability condition 
requires that use of the shared environment be averaged between the representative individuals in 
each country: 𝐸𝐶 = (1 𝑛)⁄ ∑ 𝐸𝑖. Thus, in terms of consumption levels, these sustainability 
conditions become, respectively: η = 𝐸𝐶 = ∑ 𝑝𝑖θ𝑖𝑋𝑖 and η = 𝐸𝐶 = (1 𝑛)⁄ ∑ θ𝑖𝑋𝑖. I will use the 
non-weighted sustainability condition for strong sustainability, and the weighted sustainability 
condition for the other sustainability paradigms. Let us assume that the utility for the future 
generation (UF) depends only on the consumption level: 
𝑈𝐹 = 𝑋𝐹αF with αF =
1
𝑛
∑ α𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 
Where αF represents the future preference for consumption, and it is assumed to be the average 
across all countries of the current preference for consumption, αi. Indeed, I assume that use of the 
environment is in a long-run equilibrium so that people do not need to feel a duty to preserve the 
environment for subsequent generations. Let us assume that the welfare of the current generation in 
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country i (Ui) depends on the consumption level, the current use of the shared environment, and the 
welfare of the future generation: 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖
α𝑖 (∑ 𝑝𝑖𝐸𝑖)
−β𝑖
𝑈𝐹γ𝑖 
Where αi represents the current preference for consumption in country i, βi represents the degree of 
concern for nature, and γi represents the degree of concern for future generations. In other words, 
each country is assumed to be concerned about the shared environment (i.e., EC) rather than about 
its own environment (i.e., Ei). This could account for a country i characterised by an above-average 
concern for the environment suffering from an above-average use of the environment by country j. 
Next, each country is assumed to disregard the welfare of the current generation in other countries 
(Lauwers, 2012). Indeed, the concern for welfare in other countries seems to be more plausible in 
the case of different levels of development (e.g., European vs. African countries that are facing the 
Mediterranean Sea). Appendix B presents a formalisation of this analysis for countries with 
different developmental levels. 
Note that a logarithmic transformation of the Cobb-Douglas utility functions permits analytical 
solutions. Moreover, apart from nature, welfare could be directly affected by other types of capital 
such as social, physical, and human capital, where these forms of capital, like nature, contribute to 
achieving a given consumption level. Finally, each parameter attached to an item of the Cobb-
Douglas utility function (e.g., α to consumption, β to the environment, γ to the welfare of future 
generations) can be related to the proportion of the budget spent to purchase it. Let us assume that a 
representative individual in the current generation is concerned about welfare inequality between 
countries: 
𝑈𝐶 = [(∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑈𝑖)
1−ε
]
1/(1−ε)
 
Where ε is the degree of aversion to intra-generational inequality (Asheim et al., 2012). Thus, the 
overall utility is given by: 
𝑈 = [𝑈𝐶1−ζ + 𝑈𝐹1−ζ]
1/(1−ζ)
 
Where ζ is the degree of aversion to inter-generational inequality. Alternatively, a representative 
individual in the current generation could be concerned about inequality in use of the shared 
environment between countries: 
𝑊𝐶 = [∑ 𝐸𝑖
1−ε
]
1/(1−ε)
 
Thus, the overall welfare would be given by: 
𝑊 = [𝐸𝐶1−ζ + 𝐸𝐹1−ζ]
1/(1−ζ)
 
Note that the time discount rate is assumed to be 0, as this is the only value that is consistent with 
long-run equilibria. Moreover, each social utility or welfare function can be linked to an Atkinson 
inequality index, in which parameters ε and ζ also represent inequality aversion (Cowell, 1995). 
Finally, extreme values of ε and ζ (i.e., at 0 and 1) permit analytical solutions. 
Many theoretical definitions of the four sustainability paradigms can be suggested (Aznar-Marquez 
& Ruiz-Tamarit, 2016). Here, I will apply the analytical definitions summarised in Table 1. 
Note that countries could adopt a non-cooperative attitude (here, represented by a Nash equilibrium 
for each country’s welfare; this represents a scenario in which one or more countries attempt to 
maximize their own welfare rather than overall welfare) or a cooperative attitude (here, represented 
by maximisation of the overall welfare or utility). Moreover, referring to a non-cooperative scenario 
disregards the aversion to intra- and inter-generational inequality: a country that maximises its own 
welfare by taking choices by other countries as given neglects the consequences of its choices for 
the welfare of other countries, and, consequently, neglects the differences between its current 
welfare and other countries’ current welfare as well as the differences between all countries’ current 
welfare and all countries’ future welfare. Finally, replacing EC ≤ EF with Ei ≤ EF for each i (i.e., 
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each country is expected to achieve its own sustainability) is inappropriate in the case of a shared 
environment. 
Table 1. The analytical definitions of the four sustainability paradigms. U, overall utility in terms of 
consumption; UF, utility for the future generation; Ui, utility for the current generation in country i; UC, total 
weighted utility for the current generation; EC, total weighted use of the environment by the current generation; 
EF, use of the environment by the future generation; XC, total weighted per capita consumption by the current 
generation; XF, per capita consumption by the future generation; W, overall welfare in terms of the 
environment. 
Paradigm Non-cooperative scenario Cooperative scenario 
Weak sustainability Max Ui s.t. UF ≥ Ui Max U s.t. UF ≥ UC 
A-growth Max Ui s.t. EC ≤ EF Max U s.t. EC ≤ EF 
De-growth Min XC s.t. UF ≥ Ui Min XC s.t. UF ≥ UC 
Strong sustainability Max W s.t. EC ≤ EF Max W s.t. EC ≤ EF 
 
Note that the analytical definition of de-growth does not depend on Ei. This is consistent with the 
main critiques to this paradigm (i.e., a reduction in the economic scale might not lead to a reduction 
in environment use). Moreover, the four sustainability paradigms share couples of conditions: for 
example, Max Ui and Max U are shared by weak sustainability and a-growth; UF ≥ UC is shared by 
weak sustainability and de-growth; and EC ≤ EF is shared by a-growth and strong sustainability. 
Finally, the analytical definition of strong sustainability assumes that ε and ζ are set at 1. This is 
consistent with the main feature of this paradigm (i.e., maximum aversion to inequality). 
These systems of equations will be solved for Xi to check for the existence of sustainability 
solutions at current preferences or for a set of consumption preferences (i.e., αi, βi, γi, ε, ζ) at current 
consumption levels to check which country should change its preferences to a larger extent. 
Moreover, because other changes could affect the equilibria, I will perform a ceteris paribus 
analysis. Finally, dynamic stability conditions will not be considered; instead, static sustainability 
equilibria will be obtained. 
4. Analytical results 
This section will provide analytical solutions in the case of extreme values of the parameters, 
whereas section 5 will provide numerical solutions for a case study for countries surrounding the 
Baltic Sea. Note that, for the sake of completeness, solutions for each paradigm will be replicated, 
although they are equal in some different situations (e.g., strong sustainability is not affected by a 
cooperative vs. non-cooperative context, and it does not depend on βi nor on γi). 
4.1. Solutions in a non-cooperative scenario (β, γ) 
For a situation in which each country chooses its own consumption level Xi to maximise its own 
utility Ui by taking as given the consumption levels in other countries Xj (i.e., a Nash equilibrium) 
so that the current generation’s aversion to inequality for the current generation and for future 
generations are both at their minimum (i.e., ε = ζ = 0), the analytical solutions for the four 
sustainability paradigms are as follows: 
Weak sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max Ui and UF ≥ Ui): 
(I) 𝑋𝑖 =
η α𝑖
𝑝𝑖θ𝑖β𝑖
 and (II) 𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝐸𝐶
β𝑖/α𝑖𝑈𝐹(1−γ𝑖)/α𝑖 
A-growth (i.e., first-order conditions for Max Ui and EC ≤ EF): 
(I) 𝑋𝑖 =
η α𝑖
𝑝𝑖θ𝑖β𝑖
 and (II) ∑ 𝑝𝑖θ𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
≤ η 
De-growth (i.e., UF ≥ Ui and XF ≤ XC): 
(I) 𝑋𝑖 ≤ (𝐸𝐶
β𝑖𝑈𝐹1−γi)
1 α𝑖⁄   and (II) ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
≥ 𝑋𝐹 
Strong sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max W and EC ≤ EF): 
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(I) 𝑋𝑖 =
η
θ𝑖
 and (II) ∑ 𝑝𝑖θ𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
≤ η 
4.2. Solutions in cooperative scenarios (β, γ, ε, ζ) 
For a situation in which all countries simultaneously choose each current consumption level Xi to 
maximise the overall utility U (i.e., a cooperative equilibrium), the current generation’s aversion to 
inequality for the current generation and for future generations are both at their minimum (i.e., ε = ζ 
= 0), the analytical solutions for the four sustainability paradigms are as follows: 
Weak sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and UF ≥ UC): 
(I) 𝑋𝑖 =
η α𝑖
θ𝑖  ∑ 𝑝𝑖β𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 and (II)𝑋𝑖 ≤  [(𝑈𝐹𝐶𝑖)/𝑝𝑖]
1 α𝑖⁄  
where: 
𝑈𝐹𝐶𝑖 =  (𝐸𝐶
β𝑖𝑈𝐹1−γi − ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑋𝑗
α𝑗𝐸𝐶β𝑖−β𝑗𝑈𝐹γ𝑗−γ𝑖
𝑛
𝑘
) 
A-growth (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and EC ≤ EF): 
(I) 𝑋𝑖 =
η α𝑖
θ𝑖  ∑ 𝑝𝑖β𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
  and (II) ∑ 𝑝𝑖θ𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
≤ η 
De-growth (i.e., UF ≥ UC and XF ≤ XC): 
(I) 𝑋𝑖 ≤  [(𝑈𝐹𝐶𝑖)/𝑝𝑖]
1 α𝑖⁄  and (II) ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
≥ 𝑋𝐹 
Strong sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max W and EC ≤ EF): 
(I) 𝑋𝑖 =
η
θ𝑖
 and (II) ∑ 𝑝𝑖θ𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
≤ η 
 For a situation in which all countries simultaneously choose each consumption level Xi to maximise 
the overall utility U (i.e., a cooperative equilibrium), with the current generation’s aversion to 
inequality for the current generation at its maximum (i.e., ε = 1), and with the current generation’s 
aversion to inequality for future generations at its minimum (i.e., ζ = 0), the analytical solutions for 
the four sustainability paradigms are as follows: 
Weak sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and UF ≥ UC): 
(I) 𝑋𝑖 = η
 𝑝𝑖β𝑖− 𝑝𝑗 β𝑗
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖 𝑈𝐹
−
 𝑝𝑖γ𝑖− 𝑝𝑗 γ𝑗
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖 𝑋𝑗
 𝑝𝑗 α𝑗
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖  and (II) 𝑋𝑖 ≤  [(𝑈𝐹𝐶𝑖)/𝑝𝑖]
1 α𝑖⁄  
A-growth (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and EC ≤ EF): 
(I) 𝑋𝑖 = 𝜂
 𝑝𝑖β𝑖− 𝑝𝑗 β𝑗
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖 𝑈𝐹
−
 𝑝𝑖γ𝑖− 𝑝𝑗 γ𝑗
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖  𝑋𝑗
 𝑝𝑗 α𝑗
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖   and (II) ∑ 𝑝𝑖θ𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
≤ η 
De-growth (i.e., UF ≥ UC and XF ≤ XC): 
(I) 𝑋𝑖 ≤  [(𝑈𝐹𝐶𝑖)/𝑝𝑖]
1 α𝑖⁄  and (II) ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
≥ 𝑋𝐹 
Strong sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max W and EC ≤ EF): 
(I) 𝑋𝑖 =
η
θ𝑖
 and (II) ∑ 𝑝𝑖θ𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
≤ η 
For a situation in which all countries simultaneously choose each consumption level Xi to maximise 
the overall utility U (i.e., a cooperative equilibrium), with the current generation’s aversion to 
inequality for the current generation at its minimum (i.e., ε = 0), and with the current generation’s 
aversion to inequality for future generations at its maximum (i.e., ζ = 1), the analytical solutions for 
the four sustainability paradigms are as follows: 
Weak sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and UF ≥ UC): 
(I) 𝑋𝑖 = exp
𝑈𝐹
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖  𝜂
∑ 𝑝𝑖β𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 𝑝𝑖 α𝑖 𝑈𝐹
−
∑ 𝑝𝑖γ𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 𝑝𝑖 α𝑖 ∏ 𝑋𝑗
− 
 𝑝𝑗 α𝑗
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖
𝑛
𝑘
 and (II)𝑋𝑖 ≤  [(𝑈𝐹𝐶𝑖)/𝑝𝑖]
1 α𝑖⁄  
A-growth (i.e., first-order conditions for Max U and EC ≤ EF): 
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(I) 𝑋𝑖 = exp
𝑈𝐹
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖   𝜂
∑ 𝑝𝑖β𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 𝑝𝑖 α𝑖  𝑈𝐹
−
∑ 𝑝𝑖γ𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 𝑝𝑖 α𝑖  ∏ 𝑋𝑗
− 
 𝑝𝑗 α𝑗
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖
𝑛
𝑘
 and (II) ∑ 𝑝𝑖θ𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
≤ η 
De-growth (i.e., UF ≥ UC and XF ≤ XC): 
(I) 𝑋𝑖 ≤  [(𝑈𝐹𝐶𝑖)/𝑝𝑖]
1 α𝑖⁄  and (II) ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
≥ 𝑋𝐹 
Strong sustainability (i.e., first-order conditions for Max W and EC ≤ EF): 
(I) 𝑋𝑖 =
η
θ𝑖
 and (II) ∑ 𝑝𝑖θ𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
≤ η 
Where i refers to a sum or a product that includes all n countries, whereas k refers to a sum that 
excludes country i. 
Comparing solutions in the non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios with ε = ζ = 0 for weak 
sustainability and a-growth suggests that each country must consume less in a cooperative scenario 
than in a non-cooperative scenario (i.e., pi βi < ∑ pi βi), although this decrease must be smaller if the 
country is characterised by an above-average concern for the environment (i.e., βi > ∑ pi βi). 
Analysing solutions in cooperative scenarios with ε = 1 and ζ = 0 for weak sustainability and a-
growth highlights that, regardless of the environmental use intensity, a larger country i characterised 
by a larger preference for consumption (i.e., pi αi > pj αj), a smaller concern for the environment 
(i.e., pi βi < pj βj), and a larger concern for future generations (i.e., pi γi > pj γj) than country j must 
consume less than country j. 
Analysing solutions for cooperative scenarios with ε = 0 and ζ = 1 for weak sustainability and a-
growth highlights that, regardless of environmental use intensity, a larger country i characterised by 
a larger preference for consumption than the other countries (i.e., pi αi > pj αj) must consume less 
than the other countries, whereas the concerns for the environment (βi) and for future generations 
(γi) affect sustainable consumption in country i based on the average for all countries rather than on 
the different values for country i and country j. 
Comparing solutions in non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios for de-growth suggests that, 
regardless of environmental use intensity, a country i characterised by a larger concern for the 
environment (i.e., βi > βj for all j ≠ i) and a smaller concern for future generations (i.e., γi < γj for all 
j ≠ i) than all other countries must consume less in a cooperative scenario than in a non-cooperative 
scenario. 
4.3. Contextual stability from sensitivity analyses (α, θ) 
Since Xi directly affects both utility Ui and environment use Ei, this section will calculate the partial 
derivatives of Xi with respect to the contextual parameters (i.e., αi and θi) to clarify the magnitude of 
their effects (i.e., the resulting rate of change). Note that if the sustainability solution is identified by 
an equality and an inequality (e.g., weak sustainability and a-growth), I will show the partial 
derivative of the equality; the partial derivative of the inequality affects only the feasibility of the 
solution. Moreover, strong sustainability conditions do not depend on αi and depend quadratically 
on θi (i.e., ∂Xi⁄∂θi = – η/θi
2
). Finally, if the sustainability solution is identified by two weak 
inequalities (e.g., de-growth), I will calculate the partial derivatives of both inequalities as if they 
were equalities; both these equalities affect the sustainability solutions. 
In particular, in a non-cooperative scenario for weak sustainability and a-growth: 
∂𝑋𝑖
𝜕α𝑖
=  
η 
𝑝𝑖θ𝑖β𝑖
 and 
∂𝑋𝑖
𝜕θ𝑖
= −
η α𝑖
 θ𝑖
2𝑝𝑖β𝑖
 
In a cooperative scenario with ε = 0 and ζ = 0 for weak sustainability and a-growth: 
∂𝑋𝑖
𝜕α𝑖
=
η 
θ𝑖 ∑ 𝑝𝑖β𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 and 
∂𝑋𝑖
𝜕θ𝑖
= −
η α𝑖
 θ𝑖
2 ∑ 𝑝𝑖β𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 
In a cooperative scenario with ε = 1 and ζ = 0 for weak sustainability and a-growth: 
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∂𝑋𝑖
𝜕α𝑖
= η
 𝑝𝑖β𝑖− 𝑝𝑗β𝑗
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖 𝑈𝐹
−
 𝑝𝑖γ𝑖− 𝑝𝑗γ𝑗
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖  α𝑖 𝑋𝑗
 𝑝𝑗 α𝑗
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖  [
 𝑝𝑖γ𝑖 −  𝑝𝑗γ𝑗
𝑝𝑖α𝑖
ln[𝑈𝐹] −
 𝑝𝑖β𝑖 −  𝑝𝑗β𝑗
𝑝𝑖α𝑖
ln[η]
−
 𝑝𝑗α𝑗
𝑝𝑖α𝑖
ln[𝑋𝑖]]  and 
∂𝑋𝑖
𝜕θ𝑖
= 0 
In a cooperative scenario with ε = 0 and ζ = 1 for weak sustainability and a-growth: 
∂𝑋𝑖
𝜕α𝑖
=
1
 α𝑖2𝑝𝑖
{ exp
𝑈𝐹
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖  η
∑ 𝑝𝑖β𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 𝑝𝑖 α𝑖  𝑈𝐹
−
∑ 𝑝𝑖γ𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 𝑝𝑖 α𝑖  ∏ 𝑋𝑗
− 
 𝑝𝑗 α𝑗
𝑝𝑖 α𝑖
𝑛
𝑘
   [∑ 𝑝𝑖γ𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
ln[𝑈𝐹] − ∑ 𝑝𝑖β𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
ln[η]
+  𝑝𝑗 α𝑗ln[𝑋𝑖]] −  𝑈𝐹}  and 
∂𝑋𝑖
𝜕θ𝑖
= 0 
In a non-cooperative scenario for de-growth: 
∂𝑋𝑖
𝜕α𝑖
= −
(𝐸𝐶β𝑖𝑈𝐹1−γi)
1 α𝑖⁄ 𝑙𝑛[𝐸𝐶β𝑖𝑈𝐹1−γ𝑖]
𝛼𝑖2
 or 
∂𝑋𝑖
𝜕θ𝑖
= −
𝑛 η 
 (∑ θ𝑖
𝑛
𝑖 )
2
  
In a cooperative scenario for de-growth: 
∂𝑋𝑖
𝜕α𝑖
= −
[(𝑈𝐹𝐶𝑖)/𝑝𝑖]
1 α𝑖⁄ ln[𝐸𝐶β𝑖𝑈𝐹1−γi − ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑋𝑗
α𝑖𝐸𝐶β𝑖−β𝑗𝑈𝐹𝛾𝑗−γ𝑖𝑛𝑗 ]
α𝑖2
 or 
∂𝑋𝑖
𝜕θ𝑖
= −
𝑛 η 
 𝑝𝑖(∑ θ𝑖
𝑛
𝑖 )
2
 
Where i refers to a sum or a product that includes all n countries, whereas k refers to a sum that 
excludes country i. 
Comparing the derivatives in non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios with ε = ζ = 0 for weak 
sustainability and a-growth suggests that each country changes its consumption less in a cooperative 
scenario than in a non-cooperative scenario (i.e., pi βi < ∑ pi βi) due to improved environmental 
technology and modified consumption patterns, although this decrease must be smaller if the 
country is characterised by an above-average concern for the environment (i.e., βi > ∑ pi βi). 
Analysing the derivatives in a cooperative scenario with ε = 1 and ζ = 0 for weak sustainability and 
a-growth highlights that a larger country i characterised by a larger preference for consumption (i.e., 
pi αi > pj αj), a smaller concern for the environment (i.e., pi βi < pj βj), and a larger concern for future 
generations (i.e., pi γi > pj γj) than country j changes its consumption to a larger extent than the other 
country j due to modified consumption patterns. 
Analysing the derivatives in a cooperative scenario with ε = 0 and ζ = 1 for weak sustainability and 
a-growth highlights that a larger country i characterised by a larger preference for consumption than 
the other countries (i.e., i.e., pi αi > pj αj) changes its consumption to a smaller extent than the other 
countries due to modified consumption patterns, whereas the concerns for the environment (βi) and 
for future generations (γi) affect sustainable consumption in country i based on the average for all 
countries rather than on the different values for country i and country j. 
Comparing the derivatives in non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios for de-growth suggests that 
a country i characterised by a larger concern for the environment (i.e., βi > βj for all j ≠ i) and a 
smaller concern for future generations (i.e., γi < γj for all j ≠ i) than all other countries changes its 
consumption to a smaller extent in a cooperative scenario than in a non-cooperative scenario due to 
improved environmental technology and modified consumption patterns. 
4.4. Relative effectiveness based on a comparison of solutions 
Since strong sustainability attaches a larger relative importance to ecological systems vs. economic 
systems than in the other sustainability paradigms (i.e., a tentative ordering would be strong 
sustainability > de-growth > a-growth > weak sustainability), this section will compare 
consumption levels Xi under weak sustainability, a-growth, and de-growth with the consumption 
level under strong sustainability. In particular, in a non-cooperative scenario, Xi for weak 
sustainability and a-growth is larger than Xi for strong sustainability if: 
α𝑖 ≥ 𝑝𝑖β𝑖 
In a cooperative scenario, Xi with ε = ζ = 0 for weak sustainability and a-growth is larger than Xi for 
strong sustainability if: 
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α𝑖 ≥ ∑ 𝑝𝑖β𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 
In a cooperative scenario, Xi with ε = 1 and ζ = 0 for weak sustainability and a-growth is larger than 
Xi for strong sustainability if: 
α𝑖 ≥
ln[η](𝑝𝑖β𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗β𝑗) − ln[𝑈𝐹](𝑝𝑖γ𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗γ𝑗) + ln[𝑋𝑗]𝑝𝑗α𝑗
𝑝𝑖ln[η θ𝑖⁄ ]
 
In a cooperative scenario, Xi with ε = 0 and ζ = 1 for weak sustainability and a-growth is larger than 
Xi for strong sustainability if: 
α𝑖 ≥
𝑈𝐹 + ln[η] ∑ 𝑝𝑖β𝑖
𝑛
𝑖 − ln[𝑈𝐹] ∑ 𝑝𝑖γ𝑖
𝑛
𝑖 − ∑ 𝑝𝑗α𝑗
𝑛
𝑘 𝑋𝑗
𝑝𝑖ln[η θ𝑖⁄ ]
 
In a non-cooperative scenario, Xi for de-growth is larger than Xi for strong sustainability if: 
α𝑖 ≥
ln[𝐸𝐶𝛽𝑖𝑈𝐹1−γ𝑖]
ln[𝜂 θi⁄ ]
 
In a cooperative scenario, Xi for de-growth is larger than Xi for strong sustainability if: 
α𝑖 ≥
ln[𝐸𝐶β𝑖𝑈𝐹1−γ𝑖 − ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑋𝑗
α𝑖𝐸𝐶β𝑖−β𝑗𝑈𝐹γ𝑗−γ𝑖𝑛𝑘 ]
ln[η θ𝑖⁄ ]
  
Where i refers to a sum that includes all n countries, whereas k refers to a sum that excludes country 
i. 
Comparing solutions in non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios with ε = ζ = 0 for weak 
sustainability and a-growth suggests that, regardless of θi, each country is likely to consume more 
than under a strong sustainability solution in non-cooperative scenario than in a cooperative 
scenario (i.e., pi βi < ∑ pi βi), but to a smaller extent if the country is characterised by an above-
average concern for the environment (i.e., βi > ∑ pi βi). 
Analysing solutions in a cooperative scenario with ε = 1 and ζ = 0 for weak sustainability and a-
growth highlights that each country i in a group of similar countries is likely to consume more than 
under a strong sustainability solution, although a larger country i characterised by a smaller 
preference for consumption (i.e., pi αi < pj αj), by a larger concern for the environment (i.e., pi βi > pj 
βj), and by a smaller concern for future generations (i.e., pi γi < pj γj) than country j consumes more 
than under a strong sustainability solution, but to a smaller extent than for the other country j. 
Analysing solutions in a cooperative scenario with ε = 0 and ζ = 1 for weak sustainability and a-
growth highlights that a larger country i characterised by a larger preference for consumption than 
the other countries (i.e., pi αi > pj αj) is likely to consume more than under a strong sustainability 
solution, and to a larger extent than the other countries, whereas the concerns for the environment 
(βi) and for future generations (γi) affect the optimal consumption in the country i based on the 
average for all countries rather than on the different values for country i and country j. 
Comparing solutions in non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios for de-growth suggests that, 
regardless of θi, a country i characterised by a larger concern for the environment (i.e., βi > βj for all 
j ≠ i) and a smaller concern for future generations (i.e., γi < γj for all j ≠ i) than all other countries is 
likely to consume more than in a strong sustainability solution, but to a larger extent in a 
cooperative scenario than in a non-cooperative scenario. 
5. Numerical results for a case study of the Baltic Sea 
The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) was established in 1974 by nine contracting countries 
(Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Sweden) to protect 
the environment of the Baltic Sea (Blenckner et al., 2015; Elmgren et al., 2015; Valman, 2016). The 
situation under this agreement is close to the non-cooperative scenario depicted in the previous 
section. A command-and-control management model was adopted that set fixed targets (e.g., a 40% 
reduction of nutrient inputs into the sea for all countries). The Baltic Sea Action Plan was signed in 
2007 by the same countries (and by the EU) based on an ecosystem approach (Hassler et al., 2013; 
Valman et al., 2016; Varjopuro et al., 2014); in this approach, a desired ecosystem status must be 
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achieved, even if this requires different policies for some countries. This is close to the strong 
sustainability paradigm depicted in the previous section. 
In this section, I will assess whether this governance model (i.e., strong sustainability in a non-
cooperative scenario) is efficient in terms of welfare and effective in terms of environment use by 
suggesting specific policies for specific countries, and will investigate whether there are alternative 
but equivalent sustainability paradigms in terms of welfare or environment use by identifying which 
specific policies should be implemented to support these paradigms. 
5.1. Data and normalisations 
Some parameters of the model developed in section 3 can be directly estimated. In particular, the 
proportions of the total current population in each country were based on World Bank world 
development indicators (http://data.worldbank.org) for 2012 (Table 2). Note that I approximated the 
relevant populations (i.e., those that are affected by HELCOM) in Germany, Poland, and Russia as 
40, 20, and 10% of the total national population, respectively, since not all of the population lives 
close enough to the Baltic Sea to be included in the analysis. 
Table 2. The dataset used in the Baltic Sea study. Per capita consumption by the future generation (XF) = 8.354, 
per capita use of the environment by the future generation (EF) = 1.7, and utility for the future generation as a 
function of the consumption level (UF) = 2.015. Abbreviations for the current generation in each country: α, 
preference for consumption; β, the degree of concern for nature; γ, the degree of concern for future generations; 
θ, use of the environment per unit consumption; E, use of the environment; p, proportion of the total population; 
PPP, purchasing power parity; U, utility as a function of the consumption level; X, per capita consumption. Min 
= the smallest value across countries; Gini = Gini inequality index; Average = weighted mean based on the 
percentage of the total population. 
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DNK 5,591,572 0.08 5.5 42,869 0.13 67.60 28.979 0.33 0.60 0.01 3.00 0.02 3.070 
EST 1,322,696 0.02 6.9 25,287 0.27 60.70 15.349 0.33 1.20 0.02 2.11 0.01 2.442 
FIN 5,413,971 0.07 5.9 39,489 0.15 71.10 28.077 0.33 0.70 0.01 3.42 0.02 3.041 
DEU 16,085,165 0.22 5.3 43,035 0.12 67.80 29.178 0.33 1.10 0.01 2.87 0.02 3.050 
LVA 2,034,319 0.03 6.3 20,482 0.31 71.10 14.563 0.33 2.90 0.04 2.34 0.02 2.332 
LTU 2,987,773 0.04 5.8 23,722 0.24 64.60 15.325 0.33 0.70 0.01 1.92 0.01 2.464 
POL 15,225,266 0.21 4.4 22,872 0.19 71.30 16.308 0.33 0.80 0.01 0.88 0.01 2.498 
RUS 14,320,168 0.20 5.7 23,299 0.24 58.60 13.653 0.33 0.50 0.01 1.13 0.01 2.367 
SWE 9,519,374 0.13 7.3 43,263 0.17 65.10 28.164 0.33 0.50 0.01 3.28 0.02 3.048 
Min   4.400    13.653      2.356 
Gini   0.152    0.337      0.122 
Average   5.591    21.945  0.80 0.01 2.14 0.01 2.753 
 
The ecological conditions of the Baltic Sea have been deteriorating for decades due to the impacts 
of urbanisation, industrialisation, coastal development, intensive agriculture, forestry, and 
unsustainable fisheries, and closer cooperation between the policy domains or a merger between 
sectors to reach a more holistic understanding of the Baltic Sea and its management have been 
advocated (Valman, 2013). Thus, I will use the ecological footprint (i.e., the biologically productive 
12 
 
area needed to provide everything an individual uses) as the indicator of the ecosystem’s status; that 
is, a lower footprint value represents less pressure on the environment and thus, a more sustainable 
solution. The per capita sustainable use of the environment of a representative individual for the 
world based on the current population level requires EF to be at η = 1.7 ha 
(http://www.footprintnetwork.org): the actual use of the environment in each country (E) is based 
on data for 2012 (Table 2). Note that an overall indicator that combines some or all of the indicators 
suggested by the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (Borja et al., 2011) to be applied to a shared 
environment has not yet been developed. Thus, the ecological footprint provides a useful proxy 
until a more sophisticated indicator is developed. Similarly, the UN Sustainable Development 
Solutions Network (http://unsdsn.org) measures sustainability scores in percentages (e.g., the clean 
water and fish catch status would be 100% if this activity were totally sustainable), but the values 
are calculated for each country, not for a shared environment such as the Baltic Sea. The per capita 
income in each country (i.e., GDP in USD, purchasing power parity), were based on OECD data 
(http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org) for 2012 (Table 2). These figures let me calculate θ for each country. 
Some parameters of the model developed in section 3 can be indirectly estimated. In particular, I 
estimated the per capita consumption in each country as a percentage of GDP based on OECD data 
(http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org) for 2012 (Table 2). These figures let me calculate Xi for each 
country. Since the benchmark scenario is characterised by each country attaching the same 
importance (i.e., the same budget share) to consumption level, environmental preservation, and the 
welfare of future generations in this analysis, the budget share for consumption represents the 
parameter with the maximum budget share (i.e., concerns for the environment and future 
generations are realistically assumed not to be larger than the preference for consumption), with the 
budget shares for all parameters summing up to 1. On this basis, I have fixed αi at 0.33, and have 
normalised all other parameters with respect to this value (i.e., I multiplied the observed budget 
shares by 0.33). The per capita government expenditures on environmental protection in each 
country, as a percentage of GDP, based on OECD data (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org) for 2012 
(Table 2), was multiplied by 4, to account for both public and private expenditures as well as for 
both direct and indirect expenditures. That is, I assumed equal expenditures for each of these four 
categories of expenditure. These figures let me calculate βi for each country. The per capita 
government expenditures on environmental R&D in each country as a percentage of GDP, based on 
OECD data (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org) for 2012 (Table 2), was multiplied by 2, to account for 
both public and private expenditures. That is, I assumed equal expenditures for public and private 
expenditures. These figures let me calculate γi for each country. Note that since data for per capita 
consumption and per capita expenditures on environmental R&D as a percentage of GDP were not 
available for Latvia and Lithuania, I used the average from the largest group of countries to which 
they belong (i.e., OECD countries for Latvia and EU countries for Lithuania). These values are 
quite close to values obtained based on agricultural data for both countries (i.e., 2.65% in Latvia and 
1.90% in Lithuania). 
The remaining parameters of the model developed in section 3 require additional assumptions. In 
particular, the future population was normalised to 1. This let me compare indicators for 
representative individuals for the future generation with weighted indicators for representative 
individuals for the current generation based on the percentage of the total population. The current 
generation’s aversion to inequality for the current generation (ε) and for future generations (ζ) were 
both in the range [0,1], which represents the minimum and maximum possible aversions to 
inequality. Consumption of imported goods increases welfare where they are consumed, but might 
increase the use of the environment and thereby reduce welfare in the country where they are 
produced and then exported. In the present analysis, I assumed that this effect was negligible 
because net exports as a percentage of GDP are small in all nine Baltic countries, with an average of 
2.0% in 2012, and have a large standard deviation over time (i.e., 3.8% from 2011 to 2013). 
Table 2 also includes the calculated Ui for each country, together with the weighted EC (5.591), XC 
(21.945), and UC (2.753), based on the percentage of the total population, to depict the current 
representative individual who will be compared with the future representative individual. 
13 
 
5.2. Non-cooperative solutions (β, γ) 
To avoid issues related to recursion (e.g., sustainable consumption in each country depends on the 
use of the environment and on consumption by all countries), I solved the systems of equations 
presented in section 3 in two steps. First, I found solutions in terms of a proportional change in X 
(hereafter, ΔMean) to meet condition II, and then found country-specific values of parameters β and 
γ which support these solutions while meeting condition I. Second, I searched for a proportional 
change in the current parameters β and γ (hereafter, ΔMean) to meet condition I, and then found 
country-specific values in X that support these solutions while meeting condition II. Note that weak 
inequalities will be solved as if they were equalities in order to maximise the feasibility of the 
solution. 
Table 3. Sustainability solutions in non-cooperative scenarios for strong sustainability (parameter names 
followed by SS) and de-growth (parameter names followed by DG). Future consumption (XF) = 8.354, future 
utility (UF) = 2.015. Abbreviations: β, concern for nature; γ, concern for future generations; E, per capita use of 
the environment; X, per capita consumption; U, per capita utility. Within the de-growth columns, grey columns 
refer to results with a change in β; white columns refer to results with a change in γ. The Δ terms represent 
changes in percentages; the ΔMean terms in the X, β and γ columns represent the proportional change in X 
required to meet condition II, and the proportional changes in β and γ required to meet condition I, respectively. 
Min = the smallest value across countries; Gini = Gini inequality index; Average = weighted mean based on the 
percentage of the total population. 
 
XSS ESS USS -ΔUSS XDG EDG βDG ΔβDG UDG -ΔUDG γDG ΔγDG UDG -ΔUDG 
DNK 13.077 1.68 2.378 0.22 11.134 1.43 0.334 54.62 2.008 0.34 -0.129 -5.31 2.019 0.34 
EST 6.296 1.72 1.851 0.24 5.897 1.61 -0.299 -25.94 2.102 0.14 0.172 7.16 2.015 0.18 
FIN 11.333 1.69 2.274 0.25 10.787 1.61 0.312 43.54 1.935 0.36 -0.114 -4.33 2.017 0.33 
DEU 14.167 1.74 2.432 0.20 11.210 1.38 0.338 29.70 2.031 0.33 -0.130 -5.53 2.020 0.34 
LVA 5.484 1.69 1.756 0.25 5.595 1.72 -0.345 -12.91 2.164 0.08 0.205 7.77 2.006 0.14 
LTU 7.083 1.73 1.926 0.22 5.888 1.44 -0.305 -44.53 2.033 0.17 0.171 7.88 2.018 0.18 
POL 8.947 1.72 2.065 0.17 6.265 1.21 -0.266 -34.25 1.938 0.22 0.142 15.12 2.021 0.19 
RUS 7.083 1.73 1.918 0.19 5.246 1.28 -0.433 -87.55 1.940 0.18 0.224 18.81 2.019 0.15 
SWE 10.000 1.69 2.182 0.28 10.821 1.83 0.312 61.38 1.861 0.39 -0.116 -4.54 2.017 0.34 
ΔMean 
    
0.384 
 
1.5 
   
0.9 
   
Min 5.484 1.678 1.756 
 
5.246 1.205 
  
1.861 
   
2.006 
 
Gini 0.354 0.015 0.124 
 
0.337 0.146 
  
0.049 
   
0.002 
 
Average 10.150 1.718 2.154 0.21 8.431 1.420 
  
1.967 0.27 
  
2.019 0.25 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show non-cooperative solutions in the alternative sustainability paradigms for strong 
sustainability versus de-growth and for weak sustainability versus a-growth, respectively. 
These results suggest that strong sustainability can achieve sustainability with the smallest welfare 
burden: 0.21 with strong sustainability < 0.25 with de-growth and a change in γ = 0.25 with weak 
sustainability and a change in γ < 0.27 with de-growth and a change in β. Thus, the adoption of an 
ecosystem approach by the Baltic Sea Action Plan is efficient in terms of welfare. Next, strong 
sustainability reduces inter-generational inequalities in terms of X (23.2%), E (0.4%), and U 
(15.2%). These values are calculated as follows: [(sustainable level for current generation – 
unsustainable level for current generation) / unsustainable level for current generation] – 
[(sustainable level for future generation – unsustainable level for current generation) / unsustainable 
level for current generation]). In contrast, de-growth with a change in β increases inter-generational 
inequalities in terms of E (by 6.7%) and U (by 6.1%), although both de-growth and weak 
sustainability with a change in γ reduce inter-generational inequalities in terms of X (by 0.5% for 
de-growth and by 0.3% for weak sustainability) and U (by 0.5% for both de-growth and weak 
sustainability). 
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Table 4. Sustainability solutions in non-cooperative scenarios for a-growth (parameter names followed by AG) 
and weak sustainability (parameter names followed by WS). Future consumption (XF) = 8.354, future utility 
(UF) = 2.015. Abbreviations: β, concern for nature; γ, concern for future generations; E, per capita use of the 
environment; X, per capita consumption; U, per capita utility. Within the weak sustainability columns, grey 
columns refer to results with a change in β; white columns refer to results with a change in γ. The Δ terms 
represent changes in percentages; the ΔMean terms in the X, β and γ columns represent the proportional change 
in X required to meet condition II, and the proportional changes in β and γ required to meet condition I, 
respectively. Min = the smallest value across countries; Gini = Gini inequality index; Average = weighted mean 
based on the percentage of the total population. 
 
XAG EAG XWS EWS βAG UAG βWS ΔβWS UWS -ΔUWS γWS ΔγWS UWS -ΔUWS 
DNK 13.458 1.73 11.090 1.42 
  
1.491 247.49 1.335 0.56 -0.127 -5.24 2.019 0.34 
EST 7.128 1.95 5.874 1.60 
  
1.885 156.05 0.748 0.69 0.174 7.25 2.015 0.18 
FIN 13.039 1.95 10.745 1.61 
  
1.491 211.94 1.107 0.63 -0.112 -4.27 2.017 0.33 
DEU 13.550 1.67 11.166 1.38 
  
0.984 88.42 1.654 0.46 -0.128 -5.46 2.020 0.34 
LVA 6.763 2.08 5.573 1.71 
  
1.549 52.42 0.778 0.67 0.207 7.84 2.006 0.14 
LTU 7.117 1.74 5.865 1.43 
  
1.525 216.83 1.049 0.57 0.172 7.98 2.018 0.18 
POL 7.573 1.46 6.241 1.20 
  
0.773 95.66 1.598 0.36 0.144 15.33 2.021 0.19 
RUS 6.341 1.55 5.225 1.28 
  
0.698 138.59 1.465 0.38 0.226 18.98 2.019 0.15 
SWE 13.079 2.21 10.778 1.82 
  
1.077 214.44 1.177 0.61 -0.114 -4.49 2.017 0.34 
ΔMean 0.464 
 
0.383 
 
2202 
 
139 
   
1.0 
   
Min 6.341 1.457 5.225 1.201 
    
0.748 
   
2.006 
 
Gini 0.337 0.146 0.337 0.146 
    
0.291 
   
0.002 
 
Average 
  
8.398 1.415 
    
1.411 0.48 
  
2.019 0.25 
 
However, the strong sustainability solution is not Gini-equitable in terms of welfare (i.e., Gini for U 
= 0.002 with de-growth and a change in γ = 0.002 with weak sustainability and a change in γ < 
0.049 with de-growth and a change in β < 0.124 with strong sustainability) nor is it MaxMin-
equitable in terms of welfare (i.e., MaxMin for U = 2.006 with de-growth and a change in γ = 2.006 
with weak sustainability and a change in γ > 1.861 with de-growth and a change in β > 1.756 with 
strong sustainability). Next, the strong sustainability solution is not effective in terms of use of the 
environment (i.e., Average E = 1.718 with strong sustainability > 1.420 with de-growth > 1.415 
with weak sustainability). 
Note that an average increase in β larger than 33 (i.e., 0.33/0.01, the weighted average percentage 
expenditure on environmental protection in Table 2) is assumed to be unfeasible. Moreover, to 
avoid under-determination of the numerical system, UF = Ui rather than UF = UC is used for 
cooperative scenarios. Finally, an average increase in γ larger than 33 (i.e., 0.33/0.01, the weighted 
average percentage expenditure on environmental R&D in Table 2) is assumed to be unfeasible. 
In general, in terms of internal consistency, Tables 3 and 4 suggest that weak sustainability is never 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient and thus is internally inconsistent. A-growth is never feasible. De-growth is 
never MaxMin-equitable and thus it is internally inconsistent. Strong sustainability is Gini-equitable 
in terms of use of the environment (i.e., Gini for E = 0.015 with strong sustainability < 0.146 with 
de-growth = 0.146 with weak sustainability) and so it is internally consistent. 
As far consistency with equity approaches, there are no Kaldor-Hicks efficient solutions (i.e., 
Average U is less than 2.753 for all sustainability solutions). This implies that the utilitarian 
approach (i.e., Kaldor-Hicks efficient for UC) is unfeasible. De-growth and a change in γ (Gini = 
0.002), de-growth and a change in β (Gini = 0.049), and weak sustainability and a change in γ (Gini 
= 0.002) are Gini-equitable in terms of welfare (i.e., Gini indexes for UC are smaller than 0.122 for 
all these sustainability solutions). Thus, these paradigms are consistent with an Arneson egalitarian 
approach (i.e., Gini-equitable for UC). Strong sustainability, de-growth, and weak sustainability are 
not Gini-equitable in terms of consumption (i.e., Gini indexes for XC are 0.337 for all these 
sustainability solutions), whereas strong sustainability (Gini = 0.015), de-growth and a change in β 
(Gini = 0.146), de-growth and a change in γ (Gini = 0.146), and weak sustainability (Gini = 0.146) 
are Gini-equitable in terms of use of the environment (i.e., Gini indexes for EC are smaller than 
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0.152 for all these sustainability solutions). Thus, these paradigms are consistent with the Dworkin 
egalitarian approach (i.e., Gini-equitable for XC or Gini-equitable for EC), but not consistent with 
the Sen egalitarian approach (i.e., Gini-equitable for XC and Gini-equitable for EC). There are no 
MaxMin-equitable solutions (i.e., the MaxMin value for average U, X, and E is smaller than 2.356, 
13.653, and 4.400, respectively, in all sustainability solutions). This implies that the contractarian 
approach (i.e., MaxMin-equitable for UC, XC, and EC) is unfeasible. 
In terms of environmental policies, Tables 3 and 4 suggest that de-growth requires an average 
increase by 50% in expenditures on environmental protection (i.e., ΔMean = 1.5) if coupled with a 
change in responsibility to nature, but only Denmark, Finland, Germany and, Sweden should 
increase their environmental protection. In contrast, de-growth requires an average decrease by 10% 
in expenditures on environmental R&D (i.e., ΔMean = 0.9) if coupled with a change in 
responsibility to future generations, but Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia should 
increase their environmental R&D. Weak sustainability requires the current average expenditures 
on environmental R&D (i.e., ΔMean = 1.0) if coupled with a change in responsibility to future 
generations, but Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia should increase their environmental 
R&D. 
5.3. Cooperative solutions (β, γ, ε, ζ) 
Table 5 shows a lack of feasible solutions for the a-growth and weak sustainability paradigms in a 
cooperative scenario, where strong sustainability and de-growth are not analysed for the discussed 
above definitional and computational reasons, respectively. Thus, the non-cooperative approach 
adopted by HELCOM is rational. 
Table 5. Required value changes in cooperative scenarios for a-growth (parameter names followed by AG) and 
weak sustainability (parameter names followed by WS). Abbreviations: β, concern for nature; γ, concern for 
future generations; ε, the degree of aversion to intra-generational inequality; ζ, the degree of aversion to inter-
generational inequality. The ΔMean terms in the β and γ columns represent the proportional change in β and γ 
required to meet condition I. 
Conditions ΔMean βAG ΔMean βWS ΔMean γWS 
ε = ζ = 0 1998 129 -156 
ε = 1 and ζ = 0 No solutions 58 No solutions 
ε = 0 and ζ = 1 -314 -119 107 
 
Note that a cooperative solution with ε = 1 (i.e., welfare is equalised across current generations) is 
less feasible (i.e., no solutions in 2 out of 3 cases) than a cooperative solution with ζ = 1 (i.e., 
welfare is equalised between current and future generations). In other words, a change in attitude 
from non-cooperative to cooperative should be achieved by emphasising inter-generational rather 
than intra-generational inequality aversion. 
5.4. Sensitivity analyses (α, θ) 
Tables 6 and 7 show non-cooperative solutions in the alternative sustainability paradigms for strong 
sustainability versus de-growth and for weak sustainability versus a-growth, respectively. In both 
cases, a smaller value is attached to consumption than in Tables 3 and 4 (i.e., all αi are multiplied by 
0.75). 
Comparing Tables 6 and 7 with Tables 3 and 4 suggests that strong sustainability is still feasible, 
but is unaffected by modified consumption patterns, which is consistent with the theoretical results 
presented in section 4.3. A-growth is still unfeasible. De-growth coupled with a change in β is more 
feasible (i.e., the average required change in β is now 0.7 rather than 1.5) and is less expensive (i.e., 
the average required change in U is now 20% rather than 27%). By contrast, de-growth coupled 
with a change in γ is less feasible (i.e., the average required change in γ is now 1.1 rather than 0.9), 
although it is less expensive (i.e., the average required change in U is now 20% rather than 25%). 
These empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical insights presented in section 4.3. Weak 
sustainability coupled with a change in β is still unfeasible, although the average required change in 
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β is now 101 rather than 137. In contrast, weak sustainability coupled with a change in γ is equally 
feasible (i.e., the average required change in γ is still 0) but is less expensive (i.e., the average 
required change in U is now 20% rather than 25%). These empirical findings are also consistent 
with the theoretical insights presented in section 4.3. 
Table 6. Sustainability solutions in non-cooperative scenarios for strong sustainability (parameter names 
followed by SS) and de-growth (parameter names followed by DG). Future per capita consumption (XF) = 8.354, 
future utility (UF) = 1.691. Abbreviations: β, concern for nature; γ, concern for future generations; E, per capita 
use of the environment; X, per capita consumption; U, per capita utility. Within the de-growth columns, grey 
columns refer to results with a change in β; white columns refer to results with a change in γ. The Δ terms 
represent changes in percentages; the ΔMean terms in the X, β and γ columns represent the proportional change 
in X required to meet condition II, and the proportional changes in β and γ required to meet condition I, 
respectively. Min = the smallest value across countries; Gini = Gini inequality index; Average = weighted mean 
based on the percentage of the total population. 
 
XSS ESS USS -ΔUSS XDG EDG βDG ΔβDG UDG -ΔUDG γDG ΔγDG UDG -ΔUDG 
DNK 13.077 1.68 1.914 0.175 11.134 1.43 -0.003 0.250 1.847 0.204 -0.128 -5.27 1.694 0.270 
EST 6.296 1.72 1.584 0.189 5.897 1.61 0.005 -0.224 1.565 0.199 0.174 7.26 1.690 0.135 
FIN 11.333 1.69 1.850 0.196 10.787 1.61 0.021 0.234 1.816 0.211 -0.113 -4.29 1.692 0.265 
DEU 14.167 1.74 1.945 0.157 11.210 1.38 0.030 0.253 1.828 0.207 -0.128 -5.47 1.694 0.266 
LVA 5.484 1.69 1.519 0.192 5.595 1.72 0.000 -0.259 1.550 0.176 0.210 7.97 1.683 0.105 
LTU 7.083 1.73 1.634 0.169 5.888 1.44 0.019 -0.229 1.556 0.209 0.172 7.94 1.693 0.139 
POL 8.947 1.72 1.721 0.134 6.265 1.21 0.004 -0.200 1.581 0.204 0.143 15.27 1.695 0.147 
RUS 7.083 1.73 1.629 0.147 5.246 1.28 0.008 -0.325 1.513 0.208 0.225 18.88 1.694 0.113 
SWE 10.000 1.69 1.794 0.222 10.821 1.83 -0.018 0.234 1.855 0.196 -0.115 -4.52 1.692 0.266 
ΔMean 
    
0.616 
 
0.7 
   
1.1 
   
Min 5.484 1.678 1.519 
 
5.246 1.205 
  
1.513 
 
  
1.683 
 Gini 0.354 0.015 0.094 
 
0.337 0.146 
  
0.090  
  
0.002  
Average 10.150 1.718 1.775 0.165 8.431 1.420 
  
1.694 0.204 
  
1.693 0.199 
 
Table 7. Sustainability solutions in non-cooperative scenarios for a-growth (parameter names followed by AG) 
and weak sustainability (parameter names followed by WS). Future per capita consumption (XF) = 8.354, future 
utility (UF) = 1.691. Abbreviations: β, concern for nature; γ, concern for future generations; E, per capita use of 
the environment; X, per capita consumption; U, per capita utility. Within weak sustainability columns, grey 
columns refer to results with a change in β; white columns refer to results with a change in γ. The Δ terms 
represent changes in percentages; the ΔMean terms in the X, β and γ columns represent the proportional change 
in X required to meet condition II, and the proportional changes in β and γ required to meet condition I, 
respectively. Min = the smallest value across countries; Gini = Gini inequality index; Average = weighted mean 
based on the percentage of the total population. 
 
XAG EAG XWS EWS βAG UAG βWS ΔβWS UWS -ΔUWS γWS ΔγWS UWS -ΔUWS 
DNK 13.458 1.73 11.180 1.43 
  
1.102 182.73 1.241 0.465 -0.130 -5.33 1.694 0.270 
EST 7.128 1.95 5.922 1.62 
  
1.392 114.97 0.805 0.588 0.172 7.17 1.691 0.135 
FIN 13.039 1.95 10.832 1.62 
  
1.102 156.44 1.080 0.531 -0.115 -4.35 1.692 0.264 
DEU 13.550 1.67 11.257 1.39 
  
0.729 65.27 1.457 0.369 -0.130 -5.53 1.694 0.266 
LVA 6.763 2.08 5.618 1.73 
  
1.145 38.49 0.829 0.559 0.208 7.90 1.683 0.105 
LTU 7.117 1.74 5.912 1.45 
  
1.127 160.04 1.035 0.474 0.170 7.85 1.693 0.139 
POL 7.573 1.46 6.291 1.21 
  
0.574 70.75 1.419 0.285 0.141 15.06 1.695 0.147 
RUS 6.341 1.55 5.267 1.29 
  
0.518 102.67 1.331 0.303 0.223 18.72 1.694 0.113 
SWE 13.079 2.21 10.866 1.83 
  
0.798 158.59 1.132 0.509 -0.117 -4.58 1.692 0.266 
ΔMean 0.536 
 
0.617 
 
1652 
 
101 
   
1.0 
   
Min 6.341 1.457 5.267 1.210 
    
0.805 
 
  
1.683 
 Gini 0.337 0.146 0.337 0.146 
    
0.221  
  
0.002 0.392 
Average 10.191 1.717 8.466 1.426 
    
1.290 0.390 
  
1.694 0.199 
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However, for both de-growth and weak sustainability, all signs of changes in the values do not 
differ from those in Tables 3 and 4, although the values differ. In other words, similar 
environmental policies are suggested for the same countries, although with smaller and larger 
percentage changes for weak sustainability and de-growth, respectively. 
Table 8. Required value changes in the cooperative scenarios for a-growth (parameter names followed by AG) 
and weak sustainability (parameter names followed by WS). Abbreviations: β, concern for nature; γ, concern for 
future generations; ε, the degree of aversion to intra-generational inequality; ζ, the degree of aversion to inter-
generational inequality. The ΔMean terms in the β and γ columns represent the proportional change in β and γ 
required to meet condition I. 
Conditions ΔMean βAG ΔMean βWS ΔMean γWS 
ε = ζ = 0 1498 94 -138 
ε = 1 and ζ = 0 No solutions 37 no solutions 
ε = 0 and ζ = 1 -48 -300 126 
 
Table 8 highlights the lack of feasible solutions for the a-growth and weak sustainability paradigms 
in a cooperative scenario (i.e., all proportional changes in β and γ are larger than 33). Thus, the non-
cooperative approach adopted by HELCOM would be rational in this alternative context too. 
Tables 9 and 10 show non-cooperative solutions in the alternative sustainability paradigms for 
strong sustainability versus de-growth and for weak sustainability versus a-growth, respectively. In 
both cases, a smaller value is attached to use of the environment per unit consumption than in 
Tables 3 and 4 (i.e., all θi are multiplied by 0.75). 
Table 9. Sustainability solutions in non-cooperative scenarios for strong sustainability (parameter names 
followed by SS) and de-growth (parameter names followed by DG). Future per capita consumption (XF) = 
11.138, future utility (UF) = 2.215. Abbreviations: β, concern for nature; γ, concern for future generations; E, 
per capita use of the environment; X, per capita consumption; U, per capita utility. Within the de-growth 
columns, grey columns refer to results with a change in β; white columns refer to results with a change in γ. The 
Δ terms represent changes in percentages; the ΔMean terms in the X, β, and γ columns represent the 
proportional change in X required to meet condition II, and the proportional changes in β and γ required to meet 
condition I, respectively. Min = the smallest value across countries; Gini = Gini inequality index; Average = 
weighted mean based on the percentage of the total population. 
 
XSS Ess USS -ΔUSS XDG EDG βDG ΔβDG UDG -ΔUDG γDG ΔγDG UDG -ΔUDG 
DNK 17.436 1.68 2.622 0.152 14.848 1.43 0.342 56.01 2.208 0.286 -0.114 -4.79 2.220 0.282 
EST 8.395 1.72 2.039 0.175 7.864 1.61 -0.293 -25.45 2.309 0.065 0.152 6.19 2.216 0.103 
FIN 15.111 1.69 2.508 0.181 14.386 1.61 0.321 44.90 2.125 0.307 -0.100 -3.93 2.218 0.276 
DEU 18.889 1.74 2.682 0.130 14.950 1.38 0.346 30.42 2.234 0.275 -0.114 -4.99 2.221 0.279 
LVA 7.312 1.69 1.935 0.187 7.462 1.72 -0.339 -12.69 2.377 0.001 0.181 6.73 2.206 0.073 
LTU 9.444 1.73 2.122 0.145 7.852 1.44 -0.299 -43.77 2.235 0.099 0.150 6.83 2.219 0.106 
POL 11.930 1.72 2.272 0.096 8.356 1.21 -0.264 -33.94 2.132 0.152 0.125 13.20 2.222 0.116 
RUS 9.444 1.73 2.111 0.113 6.996 1.28 -0.430 -86.92 2.134 0.103 0.197 16.45 2.220 0.067 
SWE 13.333 1.69 2.407 0.216 14.430 1.83 0.321 63.21 2.041 0.335 -0.102 -4.12 2.218 0.277 
ΔMean 
    
0.616 
 
2.2 
   
0.8 
   
Min 7.312 1.678 1.935 
 
6.996 1.206 
  
2.041  
  
2.206 
 Gini 0.354 0.015 0.125  0.337 0.146 
  
0.049  
  
0.002  
Average 13.533 1.718 2.374 0.139 11.244 1.420 
  
2.163 0.207 
  
2.220 0.187 
 
Comparing Tables 9 and 10 with Tables 3 and 4 suggests that strong sustainability is still feasible, 
but is less expensive (i.e., the average required change in U is now 14% rather than 21%), which is 
consistent with the theoretical insights presented in section 4.3. A-growth is still unfeasible. De-
growth coupled with a change in β is less feasible (i.e., the average required change in β is now 2.2 
rather than 1.5) but is also less expensive (i.e., the average required change in U is now 20% rather 
than 27%). In contrast, de-growth coupled with a change in γ is more feasible (i.e., the average 
required change in γ is now 0.8 rather than 0.9) and less expensive (i.e., the average required change 
in U is now 19% rather than 25%). These empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical 
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insights presented in section 4.3. Weak sustainability coupled with a change in β is still unfeasible, 
although the average required change in β is now 141 rather than 137. In contrast, weak 
sustainability coupled with a change in γ is equally feasible (i.e., the average required change in γ is 
still 0) but is less expensive (i.e., the average required change in U is now 19% rather than 25%). 
These empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical insights presented in section 4.3. 
Table 10. Sustainability solutions in non-cooperative scenarios for a-growth (parameter names followed by AG) 
and weak sustainability (parameter names followed by WS). Future per capita consumption (XF) = 11.138, 
future utility (UF) = 2.215. Abbreviations: β, concern for nature; γ, concern for future generations; E, per capita 
use of the environment; X, per capita consumption; U, per capita utility. Within the weak sustainability columns, 
grey columns refer to results with a change in β; white columns refer to results with a change in γ. The Δ terms 
represent changes in percentages; the ΔMean terms in the X, β, and γ columns represent the proportional change 
in X required to meet condition II, and the proportional changes in β and γ required to meet condition I, 
respectively. Min = the smallest value across countries; Gini = Gini inequality index; Average = weighted mean 
based on the percentage of the total population. 
 
XAG EAG XWS EWS βAG UAG βWS ΔβWS UWS -ΔUWS γWS ΔγWS UWS -ΔUWS 
DNK 17.945 1.73 14.691 1.41 
  
1.514 251.34 1.472 0.524 -0.109 -4.65 2.220 0.282 
EST 9.505 1.95 7.781 1.59 
  
1.913 158.44 0.822 0.667 0.156 6.39 2.216 0.103 
FIN 17.386 1.95 14.234 1.59 
  
1.514 215.34 1.217 0.603 -0.096 -3.81 2.218 0.276 
DEU 18.068 1.67 14.792 1.37 
  
0.997 89.68 1.823 0.408 -0.110 -4.84 2.221 0.279 
LVA 9.018 2.08 7.383 1.70 
  
1.572 53.21 0.853 0.642 0.185 6.90 2.206 0.073 
LTU 9.490 1.74 7.769 1.42 
  
1.547 219.95 1.155 0.534 0.155 7.05 2.219 0.106 
POL 10.098 1.46 8.267 1.19 
  
0.781 96.65 1.762 0.299 0.129 13.69 2.222 0.116 
RUS 8.455 1.55 6.922 1.27 
  
0.705 140.01 1.614 0.322 0.202 16.84 2.220 0.067 
SWE 17.440 2.21 14.278 1.81 
  
1.093 217.66 1.293 0.579 -0.098 -3.99 2.218 0.277 
ΔMean 0.536 
 
0.617 
   
141 
   
1.0 
   
Min 8.455 1.457 6.922 1.193 
    
0.822 
 
  
2.206 
 Gini 0.337 0.146 0.337 0.146 
    
0.292  
  
0.002  
Average 13.589 1.717 11.125 1.405 
    
1.554 0.430 
  
2.220 0.187 
 
However, for both de-growth and weak sustainability, all signs for the changes in values do not 
differ from those in Tables 3 and 4, although the values are different. In other words, similar 
environmental policies are suggested for the same countries, although with smaller and larger 
percentage changes for weak sustainability and de-growth, respectively. 
Table 11. Required value changes in the cooperative scenarios for a-growth (parameter names followed by AG) 
and weak sustainability (parameter names followed by WS). Abbreviations: β, concern for nature; γ, concern for 
future generations; ε, the degree of aversion to intra-generational inequality; ζ, the degree of aversion to inter-
generational inequality. The ΔMean terms in β and γ columns represent the proportional change in β and γ 
required to meet condition I. 
Conditions ΔMean βAG ΔMean βWS ΔMean γWS 
ε = ζ = 0 2664 131 -137 
ε = 1 and ζ = 0 No solutions 71 No solutions 
ε = 0 and ζ = 1 -343 -360 103 
 
Table 11 highlights the lack of feasible solutions for the a-growth and weak sustainability 
paradigms in a cooperative scenario (i.e., all proportional changes in β and γ are larger than 33). 
Thus, the non-cooperative approach adopted by HELCOM would be rational in this alternative 
context too. 
6. Discussion 
Based on the Baltic Sea case study, several insights were gained about the sustainability paradigms. 
Cooperative solutions were never feasible. Among the non-cooperative solutions, strong 
sustainability is relatively efficient, since it requires the smallest reduction in welfare; it is also 
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internally consistent, since it is Gini-equitable in terms of environment use. In addition, it minimises 
the inter-generational inequality in X, E, and U, and is consistent with the Dworkin egalitarian 
approach, since it is not Gini-equitable for X, but it is Gini-equitable for E. A-growth was never 
feasible. De-growth can be supported either by an average change in the concern for the 
environment (i.e., an increase in environmental protection) or by an average increase in the concern 
for future generations (i.e., an increase in environmental R&D), although the latter is less expensive 
than the former. De-growth with a change in the concern for future generations minimises the intra-
generational inequality in U. De-growth is consistent with the Arneson and Dworkin egalitarian 
approaches, since it is Gini-equitable for U and E. Weak sustainability must be supported by a 
redistribution of the concern for future generations (i.e., a redistribution among countries of 
expenditures on environmental R&D) at the current average value. Weak sustainability is consistent 
with the Arneson egalitarian approach, since it is Gini-equitable for U. Weak sustainability 
minimises the intra-generational inequality in U, and is effective for  E, since it minimises the use 
of the environment. 
Thus, the ecosystem approach (i.e., here depicted as strong sustainability) that is currently adopted 
by HELCOM with a non-cooperative approach (i.e., here, represented as a Nash equilibrium) is 
relatively efficient in terms of welfare, is internally consistent, and is also consistent with the 
Dworkin egalitarian approach, but it is not effective in terms of its use of the environment. 
The main operational good news (i.e., what is lost if strong sustainability is not adopted) from this 
study is: 
1. Different feasible sustainability paradigms (i.e., weak sustainability and de-growth) support the 
same policies: the more developed countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Sweden) 
should invest in environmental protection, whereas the less developed countries (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia) should invest in R&D. 
2. Different feasible sustainability paradigms (i.e., weak sustainability and de-growth) require 
similar reductions in welfare to achieve sustainability (i.e., within a range of 25% to 27%), 
although these are larger than those required by strong sustainability (i.e., 21%) 
3. For all feasible sustainability paradigms, the sustainability burden on the more developed 
countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Sweden) is proportionally larger than that on the 
less developed countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia). 
4. For all feasible sustainability paradigms, improved environmental technology will increase the 
welfare of current generations in the less developed countries compared with the status quo, 
although strong sustainability is the most efficient paradigm (i.e., UC is 2.374 with strong 
sustainability > 2.163 with de-growth and a change in β > 2.220 with de-growth and a change 
in γ = 2.220 with weak sustainability and a change in γ). 
Note that the discrimination of countries into two groups according to the policies to be adopted 
seems to be realistic; this result could therefore be taken as a preliminary validation of the model. 
The main operational bad news (i.e., what is gained if strong sustainability is not adopted) from this 
study is: 
1. Alternative feasible sustainability paradigms (i.e., weak sustainability and de-growth) could 
improve the environmental status to a greater extent than strong sustainability. However, this 
will require a change of environmental awareness (Tynkkynen et al., 2014), which in turn will 
require closer involvement of stakeholders and the public (Tynkkynen, 2013) as well as a larger 
stakeholder involvement, willingness, and capacity to cooperate (Hendriksen et al., 2014). 
2. Alternative feasible sustainability paradigms (i.e., weak sustainability and de-growth) could 
reduce the intra-generational inequality in welfare with respect to strong sustainability. 
However, this will require a change of environmental perception (Lundberg, 2013), which in 
turn will require a larger stakeholder capacity, willingness, and commitment to transition to a 
more sustainable society (Leal Filho et al., 2016) as well as a tighter agreement among the 
stakeholders on participation, legitimacy, and top-down vs. multi-stakeholder approaches to 
governance (Hassler, 2016) 
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Note that I assumed a one-to-one relationship between changes in environmental policies (e.g., an 
increase in expenditures for environmental protection or R&D) and changes in environmental 
values (e.g., an increase in concern for nature and future generations) because governments in 
democratic countries would have difficulty in significantly increasing these expenditures from the 
current tiny levels (i.e., an average of 0.80 and 2.14% of GDP for environmental protection and 
R&D, respectively) unless these changes are supported by the general population. 
Weaknesses of the present study include: 
 It does not discuss the implementation of the governance structures needed to efficiently and 
legitimately implement ecosystem-based marine management at a regional level (Hegland et 
al., 2015). However, most operational conditions that would favour sustainability have been 
identified (e.g., an increase in the concern about future generations should be preferred to an 
increase in the duty to nature; a non-cooperative attitude should be preferred to a 
cooperative attitude). 
 It does not discuss the implementation of strategies and practices to address and cope with 
uncertainty in complex socio-ecological systems within effective assessment and 
management frameworks (Udovyk and Gilek, 2013). However, most operational conditions 
that would favour reliable sustainability have been identified (e.g., an increase in the duty to 
nature should be preferred to an increase in the concern about future generations; a non-
cooperative attitude should be preferred to a cooperative attitude). 
Strengths of the present study include: 
 It accounts for the possibility of environmental free-riding (i.e., some individuals pay for the 
consequences of environmental use by other individuals). 
 The framework combines sustainability paradigms and equity approaches to find an 
operational route towards sustainability. 
 It accounts for the possibility of context changes such as modified consumption and 
improved technology. 
 The framework relates value changes with environmental policies to find a democratic route 
towards sustainability. 
Note that neither a top-down nor a bottom-up approach is suggested to achieve suitable changes in 
environmental values; instead, the most important features linking these approaches to sustainability 
paradigms and equity or efficiency approaches are identified. 
7. Conclusions 
Environmental production policies (e.g., taxes or standards) turn out to be insufficient to achieve 
sustainability in general, particularly if a shared environment is involved. A shift to or a 
combination with environmental demand policies (e.g., environmental protection based on a sense 
of responsibility to nature β; environmental R&D based on a sense of responsibility to future 
generations γ) is advocated. However, alternative sustainability paradigms support alternative 
demand policies (e.g., weak sustainability and a-growth support changes in γ; de-growth supports 
changes in β). Moreover, some paradigms are more flexible than others (e.g., strong sustainability 
disregards both β and γ as well as non-cooperative and cooperative scenarios). Finally, different 
sustainability paradigms advocated different context changes (e.g., de-growth supports changes in 
consumption pattern α; weak sustainability and a-growth support changes in environmental 
technology θ). 
The methodology developed in this paper suggests demand policies for a shared environment in 
alternative scenarios and contexts by comparing sustainability paradigms in terms of their 
effectiveness and stability. Note that suggestions for the global environment might be different, 
since a sense of responsibility to the least-advantaged current generations could become significant 
in that context. 
Three main theoretical insights were obtained in this study. First, a non-cooperative attitude is more 
effective whenever one or more countries exhibit a large concern for the environment. Second, the 
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perspective of a single individual (i.e., the focus is on individual sustainability), as assumed by 
strong sustainability, and the perspective of a representative individual (i.e., the focus is on overall 
sustainability), as assumed by weak sustainability, a-growth, and de-growth, lead to sustainability at 
similar levels of per capita consumption and use of the environment. Third, if countries are 
relatively similar with respect to their senses of responsibility to nature and to future generations, a 
cooperative attitude should be coupled with a concern for future generations (ζ = 1) rather than for 
current generations (ε = 1). 
The main theoretical bad news from this study is that the contextual stability is larger in non-
cooperative scenarios if weak sustainability or a-growth are adopted, whereas it is larger in a 
cooperative scenario if de-growth is adopted; in other words, the stability depends on the adopted 
sustainability paradigm. In any case, stability is larger for a homogeneous group of countries (pi βi ≈ 
pj βj and pi γi ≈ pj γj). 
The main theoretical good news from this study is that the relative effectiveness is larger in non-
cooperative scenarios for all feasible sustainability paradigms (i.e., weak sustainability, de-growth, 
and strong sustainability). The case with high inter-generational inequality aversion (ζ = 1) is more 
effective than the case with high intra-generational inequality aversion (ε = 1) within the 
cooperative scenarios; in other words, the effectiveness does not depend on the adopted 
sustainability paradigm. However, effectiveness is smaller for a homogeneous group of countries (pi 
βi ≈ pj βj and pi γi ≈ pj γj). 
Three main developments from this paper seem to be particularly promising. First, it should be 
possible to apply the model at a sectoral level, with related indicators chosen for pollution 
production or resource use. Second, it should be possible to develop the current one-shot model to 
produce a dynamic model, which would allow an investigation of issues related to overlapping 
generations. Third, it should be possible to apply the model at a global level, with appropriate 
indicators for pollution production or resource use. 
Appendix A 
αF: the future preference for consumption 
αi: the current preference for consumption in country i 
βi: the degree of current concern for nature in country i 
γi: the degree of current concern for future generations in country i 
δi: the degree of current concern for less-developed current generations in country i 
ε: the degree of aversion to intra-generational inequality 
ζ: the degree of aversion to inter-generational inequality 
η: per capita equilibrium use of the environment consistent with the current relevant population 
θi: the current use of the environment for each consumption unit for the country i 
θF: the use of the environment for each consumption unit for the future generation 
EC: weighted per capita use of the environment by the current generation 
EF: per capita use of the environment by the future generation 
Ei: per capita use of the environment by the current generation in country i 
pi: proportion of the total population in country i 
U: overall utility as a function of consumption 
UC: weighted utility for the current generation as a function of consumption 
UF: utility for the future generation as a function of consumption 
Ui: utility for the current generation in country i as a function of consumption 
W: overall welfare as a function of environment use 
WC: welfare of the current generation as a function of environment use 
XC: weighted per capita consumption by the current generation 
XF: per capita consumption by the future generation 
Xi: per capita consumption in country i 
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Appendix B 
In the case of n countries at different development levels, and which share an environment, the 
model becomes: 
𝑈𝐹 = 𝑋𝐹αF with αF =
1
𝑛
∑ α𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 and 𝑋𝐹 =  η θF with θF⁄ =
1
𝑛
∑ θ𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖
α𝑖 (∑ 𝑝𝑖𝐸𝑖)
−β𝑖
𝑈𝐹γ𝑖 (∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑈𝑗)
δ𝑖
 
𝑈𝐶 = [(∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑈𝑖)
1−ε
]
1/(1−ε)
 
𝑈 = [𝑈𝐶1−ζ + 𝑈𝐹1−ζ]
1/(1−ζ)
 
𝐸𝐶 = [(∑ 𝑝𝑖𝐸𝑖)
1−ε
]
1/(1−ε)
 
𝐸 = [𝐸𝐶1−ζ + 𝐸𝐹1−ζ]
1/(1−ζ)
 
Where δi represents the degree of current concern for less developed current generations in country 
i and i refers to a sum that includes all n countries, whereas j refers to a sum that excludes country i. 
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